Making  The First Branch  First: A Radical Structural Proposal by Taylor, Marcia Whicker et al.
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 9 
Number 2 (Spring) Article 1 
April 1982 
Making "The First Branch" First: A Radical Structural Proposal 
Marcia Whicker Taylor 
Daniel R. Sabia Jr. 
Aldred Mauet 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Taylor, Marcia Whicker; Sabia, Daniel R. Jr.; and Mauet, Aldred (1982) "Making "The First Branch" First: A 
Radical Structural Proposal," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 9 : No. 2 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol9/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
Making "The First Branch" First: 
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ALFRED MA UET 
University of South Carolina 
• An initial version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the South Carolina Political 
Science Association, April, 1979. 
I 
We intend in this brief and hopefully provocative essay to propose radical 
structural changes in the United States Congress. Although we do not, of course , 
expect to see our proposals implemented , neither do we conceive ourselves as 
being engaged in a vacuous exercise . Our purpose is threefold. First , we hope to 
demonstrate that the inability of Congress to perform well its legislative and 
representative responsibilities are structuralJy induced - and could , therefore, 
be structurally corrected . In this we join those naive constitutionalists who 
assume that the attainment of desirable political goals can be facilitated by 
devising "a more perfect structure" of government. 1 Secondly , we intend to 
challenge the perhaps prevalent opinion that the "lawmaking and representa-
tional functions" of Congress are in necessary conflict - such that , for instance , 
increasing legislative efficiency would necessarily decrease representational 
efficacy . 2 Finally, we expect to contribute to the traditional reform literature on 
Congress, not by offering another set of "realistic" or piecemeal reforms (so 
characteristic of this literature ) but , on the contrary, by suggesting reforms so 
radical , so outlandish and "utopian ," as to incite re-thinking , even "free-
thinking, " on the subject. 3 
1 Alexander Hamilton , The Federalist Papers 
2 Peter K. Eisinger, et . al., Ameri can Politics (Boston: Little , Brown and Company , 1978), p. 
142. See also, e. g., Richard F. Fenno , Jr., "If , as Ralph Nader Says, Congress Is 'the Broken Branch,' 
How Come We Love Our Congressman So Much?," in Norman J. Ornstein , ed., Congress in 
Chan; e (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp . 277-287. 
Perusal of the contemporary reform literature indicates that "moderation " and " realism" are 
characteristically prescribed on the ground that only moderate reforms have a chance of success. 
Besides the fact that such a prescription automatically undercuts more imaginative exercises (such 
as the one here ), the tendency to restrict proposals to so-called "practical " reforms often results in 
the prescribing of reforms which are insufficient , superficial and / or inadequate for realizing either 
specific postulated goals, or the theoretical premises and normative ideals underlying the recom-
mendations . Even the collection of essays edited by Allred de Grazia , which proceed on the premise 
that Congress ought truly to be " the first branch ," provides a series of proposals (summarized on pp . 
457-493) primarily notable for their moderation. See Alfred de Grazia , ed ., Congress: The First 
Branch (Washington : American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research , 1966). 
There are , of course, some exceptions , such as Michael Harrington's proposal for a parliamen-
tary type system as briefly described by Ted Szulc, "Is Congress Obsolete"?," Saturday Review 
(March 3, 1979), p. 23. 
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Generally , our proposed reforms are designed to enhance Congressional 
legislative performance on the one hand and , on the other , to make more likely 
both issue voting and agency representation. With respect to the first of these 
goals, the structural changes are intended to increase the legislative expertise of 
Congressmen, the efficiency or speed with which legislation is developed, 
considered and passed, and the ability of Congress to engage in and to oversee 
comprehensive, nationally oriented, legislative programs and plans . With re-
spect to the second of these goals, the reforms are expected to bring into 
existence at least some of the conditions necessary for mandate elections and to 
expand significantly the impact of voter preferences on Congressional decision-
making . 
We begin by sketching the structurally induced weaknesses with respect to 
Congressional law-making and representation; and we then outline and try to 
justify our proposals . 
II 
Public dissatisfaction with Congress, as with government generally, is well 
documented .4 The increased visibility of both Congress and Congressmen, the 
growth of a more activist and educated public, and especially the enlargement 
of the Congressional agenda perhaps constitute the underlying causes of this 
phenomenon. Certainly media coverage - exposing scandals large and small 
and making more visible Congressional ineptness and inefficiency in the 
making of public policy - together with the increased technological capacity 
and personal willingness of Congressmen to engage in electronic media cam-
paigns and continuous constit_uent contact and service, have made more visible 
(and will continue to make more visible) members of Congress to both the 
public at large and to their constituents. Increased visibility, in turn, has allowed 
members of Congress to serve as focal points for constituent expression of 
dissatisfaction with perceived governmental, and especially Congressional, 
performance. 5 
Concommitantly, and perhaps more fundamentally, the tremendous ex-
pansion of the federal government - and so the Congressional agenda - since 
the New Deal has further increased dissatisfaction with Congress. Whether this 
expansion followed, mirrored or fostered rising citizen demand , need and 
expectation is not here a crucial issue; what is crucial is the recognition that as 
4 See, e. g., Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O'Leary, Congress in 
Crisis (Belmont, - Calif .: Wadsworth Publishing Company , Inc ., 1966); "Congressional Un-
popularity : Five Views from the Inside," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (March 9, 197 4), 
pp. 600-603; Glenn R. Parker , "Political Beliefs about the Structure of Government: Congress and 
the Presidency ," American Politics Series, Sage Professional Papers (Series #04-018, 1974), pp. 
14-17; and Szulc, "Is Congress Obsolete?," pp. 20-23. 
s On the increasing visibility of Congress and Congressmen see, e. g., Michael Reagan, The 
New Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972); Parker , "Political Beliefs about the 
Structure of Government : Congress and the Presidency "; and Kenneth G. Olson, "The Service 
Function of the United States Congress," in de Grazia , ed., Congress: The First Branch, esp. pp. 
345-346. 
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the number , type and scope of issue areas considered by Congress expanded , 
and as federal intervention into all aspects of American life grew , dissatisfaction 
on the part of the public was bound to increase as well. Indeed , it seems 
axiomatic that , as the scope of governmental policy-making and administration 
grows, governments must reduce the ratio of dissatisfaction to volume of 
governmental activity in order just to maintain constant levels of dissatisfaction 
expression . Yet the growth in scope simultaneously produces size and co-
ordination problems which mitigate the possibilities of constant or lowered 
dissatisfaction rates . 
That public dissatisfaction with Congress is high is thus by no means 
surprising . And while public criticism of Congress is frequently poorly in-
formed on specific details, occasionally inarticulate and sometimes unfair , what 
might be termed the basic thrust of citizen dissatisfaction - that Congress as an 
institution is not coping adequately and responsibly with the complexities of 
governing a democratic , diverse , technologically sophisticated society - is 
surely legitimate . Certainly Congressional scholars , as well as other Congres-
sional observers and critics , recognize this : a good deal of the literature on 
Congress can in fact be read as if the authors set out to document , and then to 
explain and / or critique , the difficulties Congress has in performing well its 
constitutionally mandated , and / or its recently expanded , duties and activities .6 
The most important tasks of Congress concern its legislative duties on the 
one hand and its representative responsibilities on the other. With respect to 
legislation , the most common criticisms of Congress concern its inefficient, 
disjointed manner of processing legislation and its inability to respond , in any 
responsible way , to national needs , programs and planning . We contend that 
these weaknesses are primarily structurally induced ; that the inefficient, dis-
jointed and diffuse legislative process characteristic of Congress is primarily 
due to two empirically interrelated , but analytically distinct , structural fea-
tures : constituency base and internal fragmentation. Both of these factors have 
been much discussed in the literature . 
By referring to the "constituency base" we mean to underscore the well 
worn observation that Congress is an allegedly national institution composed of 
members whose focus and loyalty tends to be localized .7 Since individual 
members of Congress are ultimately responsible to local and / or state parties , 
interests , groups and voters, achieving consensus , and responding to national 
issues and needs , is difficult at best. Localization enhances legislative ineffi-
ciency , fragmentation and conflict because it institutionalizes diverse interests , 
6 An excellent overview of the reform literature , and of the view of Congressional scholars and 
journalists, is provided by Davidson, Kovenock, and O'Leary , Congress in Crisis, ch. 1 and pp. 
38-47. 
7 See, e. g., Andrew Hacker , "The Elected and the Annoited ," American Political Science 
Review 55 (1961), pp. 539-549; J. N. Rosenau, National Leadership and Foreign Policy (Princeton : 
Princeton Universitr, Press, 1963); and Samuel P. Huntington , "Congressional Response to the 
Twentieth Century , ' in David B. Truman , ed., The Congress and America's Future (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall , 1965), pp. 5-31. 
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needs and values. ot only does localization constrain national orientation and 
impede efficiency; it also makes very difficult achieving any sort of national 
leadership , whether such leadership be imposed from without by parties or 
Presidents or from within by caucuses or Congressional leaders . 
In addition to localization, legislative efficiency and responsibility is 
hampered by the internal fragmentation of Congress . Congress has always been 
structurally fragmented to some extent : bicameral, for example , and with 
specialized committees in each house . However, as policy agendas, issue do-
mains and responsibilities have expanded , fragmentation and specialization 
have necessarily increased . So too, recent reforms seem to have contributed at 
least as much to the decentralization of structure and power as they have to 
fiscal responsibility, caucus control or the enhancement of Congressional power 
vis-a-vis the executive branch. 8 The efficiency with which decisions are made 
and legislation passed thus remains severely impaired. Internal specializatio n 
within each house forces a lengthy sequential process, with hearings, investiga-
tions and debates potentially occuring at the subcommittee, committee and full 
house levels. In the House of Representatives, the Rules Committee serves 
further to fragment the process there, while bills requiring expenditures must in 
each house also pass through a network of budget and appropriations subcom-
mittees and committees. The bicameral structure of Congress lengthens the 
legislative process still more, by requiring that legislation pass through a second 
subcommittee, committee and full house trio. Moreover , differences between 
legislative output from each house - differences which (it should be noted) 
have been on the increase as the scope and complexity of legislation considered 
by Congress has expanded - must be ironed out in Conference committees, 
and compromised bills must, of course, be approved or rejected on the floor of 
each house once again . 
This lengthy, fragmented process does a good deal more than make the 
passage of bills difficult and tedious; it facilitates legislative irresponsibility in 
several ways and senses. First, it makes virtually impossible overall co-ordina-
tion and integration of Congressional decision-making . Second, allegedly com-
prehensive legislation - the energy and tax bills passed by the ninety-fifth 
Congress are illustrative - is rarely very comprehensive, but is always riddled 
with provisions guaranteed to insure its ineffectiveness and / or unfairness. 
Third, interest groups have become well aware of the lengthy, decentralized 
internal and bicameral process, and often function effectively to impede or 
alter legislation at points along the way. The length of the process would be 
ponderous even in a vacuum, but in a Washington environment where the 
interest group legislative hunting season never closes, the lengthy, fragmented 
8 See, e. g., Leroy N. Rieselbach, Congressional Reform in the Seventies (Morristown , ew 
Jersey : General Learning Press, 1977); the appropriate essays in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer , eds., Congress Reconsidered ( ew York: Praeger , 1977); and Steven H. Haeberle, 
"The Institutionalization of the Subcommittee in the United States House of Representatives," 
Journal of Politics 40 (1978), pp . 1054-1065 . 
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process increases bill vulnerability to special interests attack. Fourth, bicameral-
ism encourages one house to act irresponsibly, relying upon the second to rectify 
its own profligacy or avoidance of politically unpalatable measures. Fifth, 
internal committee, and therefore membership , specialization serves to disen-
franchise constituents. Since members of Congress are primarily limited to 
effectively initiating and influencing legislation in those policy areas covered 
by subcommittees and committees on which they serve, constituent representa-
tion in other policy areas is severely limited. The extent of this "non-representa-
tion" of constituent interest is variable and there are, to be sure, mitigating 
factors; but to deny or miss its existence is to deny or overlook one serious 
implication of the structural fragmentation of Congress . 
While localization and internal fragmentation constitute the primary 
impediments to legislative efficiency and responsibility, a third factor should be 
noted : the constitutionally mandated requirement that House members serve 
two year terms . Congressional critics often cite the inordinate amount of time 
devoted by members of Congress to campaigning for re-election as a serious 
problem, an observation and complaint especially germane in the case of House 
members .9 Forced to run for office every two years, members of the House 
never stop campaigning; plans for the next election are often laid days after 
victory in the last election. Freshman members from politically vulnerable 
districts are especially driven by the need to continue campaign efforts 
throughout their entire term . Indeed, many political sages advise freshmen to 
put at least two electoral victories behind them before abating intense campaign 
efforts and turning to policy concerns. 10 
Although campaigning can interfere with legislative performance, and 
although this is particularly problematic in the case of the House, it is also true 
that the frequent election of government officials, necessitating short terms, has 
long been a staple of democratic theory. As is well known, such a view - that 
frequent elections promote accountability and agency representation - was 
entertained by the Framers; 11 and most empirical evidence supports the Fram-
ers' expectation that House members, in contrast to Senators, would in fact turn 
out to be more responsive to, and / or more likely to reflect, constituent prefer-
ences and policy orientations. Since we are interested in improving the quality 
of representation as well as legislative performance, the length of Congressional 
terms thus presents an interesting problem: for if the two year term of House 
members facilitates accountability but interferes with their legislative duties , 
the six year term of Senators facilitates their legislative performance but 
impedes their accountability . We will return to this problem in Part III . 
9 So common is this particular complaint that constitutional amendments which would extend 
House terms have been quite popular among critics and reformers - including , e. g., President 
Johnson who, in 1966,proposed just such a reform in his State of the Union message. For a review of 
the reform efforts, and of the merits of this reform, see Davidson , Kovenock and O'Leary , Congress 
in Crisis, pp . 96-98 and 106-109. 
10 See, e. g., Walter Gelhorn, When Americans Complain : Governmental Grieoance Pro-
cedures (Harvard University Press, 1966), chs. 1 and 2; and Szulc, "Is Congress Obsolete?," p. 23. 
11 James Madison , The Federalist Papers (1788), #52 and #57. 
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Mention of this problem serves to raise our second area of concern : the 
quality of Congressional representation. It is our position that constituents are 
not well represented in Congress today; that this is a situation tied directly or 
indirectly to structural factors; and that this situation could be substantially 
remedied by structural reform . By representation we mean primarily agency 
representation : a Congressman is representative (acts like an agent) to the extent 
that he or she is able (and, of course, willing 12) to translate constituency 
preferences into, and to promote or defend constituency interests and needs in, 
legislative decisions and other actions. As already mentioned, the committee 
system, by restricting the probable impact of a legislator to a limited set of 
policy areas, is one structurally induced impediment to constituency represen-
tation; and the six year term of Senators is another. But these are only two 
among a variety of obstacles which thwart the achievement of meaningful 
constituency representation. 
The central difficulty can be easily stated: Like the dinosaur, Congress has 
been unable to keep pace with its rapidly changing environment; and one 
particularly important result has been the inability of Congressmen to provide 
agency representation. Two of these environmental changes have already been 
described: the tremendous growth in the number, scope and complexity of the 
legislative agenda and in quasi-legislative responsiblities and duties (such as 
providing oversight for an enormously expanded federal bureaucracy); and 
growth in the sheer size, in the educational level, and in the political sophistica-
tion and demands, of constituents. To these a third environmental factor must 
be added: the relative decline in the power of the Congress when compared to 
the executive, and perhaps even judicial, branches. Together, these variables 
have affected the quality of representation , as well as the quality of the 
legislative performance, of the Congress . 
We know, for example, that the first two variables have, over time, forced 
increases in the number of committees and subcommittees in the Congress, 13 in 
staff size and influence, 14 and in procedures and norms governing Congres-
sional behavior and leadership patterns. 15 Each of these, in turn, has had 
negative effects on the quality of representation. Growth in the number of 
committees and subcommittees, for instance, no doubt had the positive effect of 
making available to more legislators an increased number of influential posi-
tions; but it has also had the effect of spreading or thinning, decreasing expertise 
and reducing further the individual member's capacity to influence diverse 
12 We add this caveat in recognition of the fact that, in the final analysis, the willingness of 
elected representatives to do the job for which they were elected is a decisive variable over which no 
one but the elected representative himself or herself has final control. All the constitutionalist can do 
is provide structurally grounded incentives to facilitate desired behavior - e. g., by manipulating 
tenure. 
13 See, e. g., Dodd and Oppenheimer , eds., Congress Reconsidered, Part I; and Ornstein, ed., 
Con9ress in Change , Part II. 
• See, e. g., Morris S. Ogul , "Congressional Oversight: Structures and Incentives," in Dodd and 
Oppenheimer , eds., Congress Reconsidered, ch. 10; and Michael J. Malbin, "Congressional Com-
mittee Staffs: Who 's in Charge Here?," Public Interest (Spring, 1977), pp . 16-40. 
15 See, e.g. , Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, Part III ; and Ornstein, ed., 
Congress in Change, Parts III and IV. 
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policy areas. 16 Together with the greater attention and time being spent on 
constituency service , the increase in assignments has also had the effect of 
expanding workloads to the point where superhuman effort and endurance is 
now required of responsible Congressmen. Symptoms of overwork clearly 
impede constituency representation : even assuming that legislators ' know the 
preferences of their constituents , they cannot promote these if they are unable 
to impact salient policy areas ; if they are unable to give sustained attention to 
legislative business; or if they are unable to be in two - or more - places at one 
and the same time . 
The growth of executive power and influence also raises questions con-
cerning the adequacy of Congressional representation . Deference to Presiden-
tial leadership and alleged executive expertise , the relinquishing of control over 
policy initiatives and budgets , the inability and / or unwillingness to engage in 
serious oversight functions , all contribute to a weakening of Congressional 
power and leadership in national affairs and so also to the efficacy of represen-
tation . Indeed, from a democratic standpoint, some degree of legislative su-
premacy is in our view mandatory ; and this is a view apparently shared by most 
Americans . Thus , for example , Parker has found that " ... Congress - not the 
presidency - is the institution which the electorate prefers to dominate in the 
formulation of national policy . Even in the area of foreign policy ... a greater 
proportion of the electorate favor congressional to presidential leadership . " 17 
This opinion , moreover, appears to be quite stable: poll data since the 1930s 
indicate persistent citizen preference for Congressional supremacy .18 
Recognition of expanded workloads and of Congressional weakness has, of 
course, contributed to the growth of staffs . But staff expansion has itself raised 
serious questions of accountability and representation: as staffs take on more 
and more duties, their influence in legislative negotiations and bargaining, and 
over legislative initiatives and decision-making, expands .19 Control of staffs has 
become a "new" problem , a problem rooted principally in the recognition that , 
like most executive officials, staff members are not the elected agents of the 
represented. 
Another major obstacle to agency representation and electoral accounta -
bility is the relative lack of issue voting in Congressional elections. What is 
wanted , ideally , are mandate elections wherein candidates for Congressional 
office would be elected solely on the basis of their issue positions (and , where 
applicable , on the basis of an informed evaluation of their past performance and 
fidelt y to campaign promises ). While no amount of structural reform can by 
itself bring into existence the many conditions necessary for mandate elections , 
16 See, e. g., Norman Ornstein , et . al., "The Changing Senate: From the 1950s to the 1970s," in 
Dodd and Oppenheimer , eds., Congress Reconsidered , p. 15. 
17 Parker , "'Political Beliefs about the Structure of Government : Congress and the Presidency ," 
p. 18. 
18 See Hazel Erskine , "The Polls: Presidential Power, " Public Opinion Quarterly37 (1973), pp . 
488-503 . 
19 See, e. g., Malbin , "Congressional Committee Staffs: Who's in Charge Here? "; and Szulc, "Is 
Congress Obsolete ?," p. 22. 
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such reform can reduce the obstacles to their occurrence . We will in Part III 
recommend such reforms; here we wish to lay the groundwork for our proposals 
by briefly describing some of the obstacles presently hindering the possiblity of 
mandate elections. 
In order for mandate elections to occur , constituents must in the first place 
vote; they also must seek out and perceive correctly candidate issue stands; and 
they must vote on the basis of those perceptions .20 Yet voter turnout is low in 
Congressional elections and voter ignorance of issues, and of candidate stands, 
well documented . Most often , voters are themselves blamed for this situation; 
less of ten is congressional structure cited as the culprit. We take the position that 
congressional structure must share in the blame . This is because current 
structures render voting , seeking information on issues, and seeking informa-
tion of the issue stands (and , where applicable, past performance ) of candidates, 
very cost-ineffective . Growth in the population size of constituencies has 
rendered exceedingly small the likelihood that a voter can have any impact on 
election outcomes , minimizing the incentive to vote and to vote in an informed 
way . For reasons discussed above , the typical Congressmen has little impact on 
legislative outcomes , further reducing voter interest. Finally , growth in the 
number and complexity of issue areas regarded by both Congress and the public 
as amenable to legislation has exacerbated the aggregation problem . That is, 
assuming candidates adopt and advertise during campaigns their positions on 
issues (and that such behavior is atypical may itself be to some extent struc-
turally induced ) the resultant package of issue positions cannot by voters be 
electorally disaggregated : voters must adopt or reject en toto the candidate's 
package by voting for or against the candidate . Both the theoretical and actual 
probabilities of a constituent finding a candidate who relects the constituent's 
policy preferences across the range of legislative issues are , of course, almost 
infinitesimal. And the constituent 's dilemna becomes particularly acute when a 
candidate assumes some policy positions which the constituent intensely prefers 
while simultaneously assuming other policy positions which the constituent 
intensely dislikes. 
Can structural alterations in the United States Congress promote the 
adoption and advertising of issue positions by candidates? Can structural 
change help delimit proferred candidate packages and thereby increase the 
potential for congruence between package offerings and voter preferences? 
Can such changes increase accountability , voter turnout and issue voting? And 
can these things be done in such a way that they might actually enhance 
legislative performance? To these and related questions we now turn. 
20 Again , we hasten to add that these are among the conditions necessary for mandate elections ; 
the y by no means constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions . 
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III 
Robert Weissberg has recently reminded us that there is a direct relation-
ship between the size of a representative institution and the degree to which that 
institution will represent preferences: "the greater the number of legislators, the 
more representative the institution as a whole. "21 Although Weissberg is refer-
ring to collective (or aggregate) - rather than agency - representation, the 
relationship between the size of a representative body, and the likelihood of 
representation however defined, has always been an important, and controver-
sial, issue. For example, in defending the proposed Constitution against those 
who feared that the House would be peopled by too few Representatives, 
particularly as population increased, Madison pointed out that the number of 
Representatives was in fact to be augmented as population grew - subject to 
"the sole limitation that the whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty 
thousand inhabitants. "22 Had the Congress stuck to this formula, there would 
today be well over 7,000 House members! And while this may well be an 
impracticably large number, it is nonetheless justifiable on the ground that the 
lower the ratio between the number of constituents represented and the number 
of representatives, the greater the probability of agency representation . 
Increasing substantially the size of the present Congress can, therefore, be 
defended on the ground that it would increase the probability of both aggregate 
and agency representation . But an increase in size, if properly institutionalized 
or structured , could accomplish a good deal more. A substantial increase in size 
could reduce member workloads; enhance the expertise of members by reduc-
ing thinning; and permit greater control over staff (and even permit enlarge-
ment of staff in order to expand resources and capabilities, thereby enhancing 
legislative power vis-a-vis the executive branch). 
ow an increase in size is one of our reform proposals, albeit in a radically 
altered Congressional structure. Structurally, a modified unicameralism, to-
gether with some degree of hierarchical control and external functional special-
ization, constitute the core of our proposals. It is through such means that we 
hope to maximize both agency representation, on the one hand, and responsible 
legislative performance on the other - where (to summarily repeat) responsi-
ble legislative performance includes enhancing: the efficiency or speed with 
which policy development and decision-making is made; the degree to which 
policy development and decision-making is coordinated; membership exper-
tise; a national orientation or focus; legislative power. The extent to which our 
proposals may plausibly be said to actually succeed in realizing these ends must, 
in the final analysis, be left to our readers to decide. We can here only outline 
2 1 Robert Weissberg, "Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress," American Political 
Science Review 72 (1978), p. 543. As noted in the text, Weissberg is referring to "collective" or 
aggregate representation which may be defined as the degree to which a nationally representative 
body (such as Congress) reflects the opinions, and promotes and defends the intersts, of all citizens or 
all groups - not constituents . Collective representation , unlike agency representation, does not 
provide for accountability (and is for that reason deficient on democratic grounds). 
22 James Madison, The Federalist Papers, #58. 
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the proposals (which are admittedly vague in detail) , do our best to defend them 
in these terms, and encourage the critical response we intend to provoke. 
Discussed in the remainder of this text, our reform package is also outlined in 
the Appendix . 
Hierarchical control would be imposed by a nationally representative 
Senate which , in our scheme, has lost most of its present powers but gained, on 
an exclusive basis, two great ones: the power to tax and spend. Specifically, the 
Senate would develop , initiate and pass (on the President) all revenue bills; and 
it would set an overall, binding , spending ceiling , together with binding 
subceiling limits for broad functional areas. This Senate would be composed of 
Senators elected for four year terms, on the basis of population, and from large 
regions (equal in population) rather than from states . While this would insure a 
one person-one vote basis for Senate representation and increase accountability 
by shortening tenure, the basic goals of these Senate reforms are to give one 
nationally representative body : first, the power to set national priorities by 
imposing on House legislators spending ceilings for broad functional areas (such 
as defense , foreign aid , education , housing); and, second , responsibility for tax 
laws and national budget control, hopefully and presumably with an eye to, and 
capacity for , long-range policy planning. 
Most of the powers now enjoyed by the Senate would be lost, including its 
treaty and confirmation powers and , more importantly, its power to authorize 
any legislation except , of course, tax legislation and spending ceilings. It should 
(and in our scheme would) retain its power to try impeachment cases and its role 
in amending the Constitution . More importantly , it would also be given the 
power to act as a binding mediator in cases of inter-House jurisdictional 
disputes. As will be described in a moment , our proposal includes replacing the 
present House with four functionally specialized Houses; in cases of jurisdic-
tional disputes between these Houses, the Senate would act as binding mediator. 
Giving to the Senate this additional and novel power provides another mecha-
nism for hierarchical control , enhancing policy co-ordination by a nationally 
representative body . 
The present House of Representatives is to be replaced by four functionally 
differentiated Houses. One House , for instance , might be charged with respon-
sibility for military defense and foreign affairs ; another with land use policies, 
including agricultural and environmental concerns ; a third with health , educa -
tion , welfare and housing ; and a fourth with government operations , com-
merce , banking, consumer and labor protection . Within its functional 
specializations, each House would have the power to develop and pass all 
authorizing legislation and to allocate funds , subject to the Senate imposed 
functional ceilings. Each House would also be responsible for oversight within 
the areas over which that House has legislative responsibility. Confirmation 
powers would reside in the appropriate Houses too - the Secretary of State, for 
instance , would be confirmed by the House responsible for foreign affairs . 
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The Representatives sitting in these Houses would be elected from , and so 
represent, present-day Congressional districts. The residents of each district , 
however, would have four Representatives, one in each of the four Houses. And 
these Representatives would serve a four year term . This means that the total 
number of Representatives would quadruple from its present number to 1,740. 
All the members of one House would be up for re-election in the same year , 
each House going up for election every four years. Thus, there would under our 
scheme be annual national elections: each year, all the members of one of the 
four Houses, and, additionally , one quarter of the Senators, would be up for re-
election . 
A number of benefits , we suggest, would or could be supplied under our 
proposal. On the side of legislative performance, splitting the legislative powers 
and responsibilities of the present House among four Houses of the same size 
should eliminate the problems of overwork, expertise and staff management 
and control. Although internal specialization would continue, the extent of this 
should be substantially reduced - specifically, the number of committees and 
subcommittes could be reduced, policy co-ordination within Houses should be 
greatly improved and efficiency would be enhanced as well, this last particu-
larly so when we recall that bicameralism has been considerably weakened. 
Given the reduced workloads and more focused responsibilities, the capabilities 
for engaging in oversight, for extended policy deliberation and planning and 
for anticipating and responding to public need and constituency demand would 
be considerably improved. Essentially the same can be said for the Senate. It too 
would have a much reduced, as well as much more focused, workload; the 
expertise of its members could be increased; staff management and control 
would become possible; capacities for extended policy deliberation, long-range 
planning and responsiveness to public demand would be augmented. 
With respect to agency representation, important distinctions must be 
made between the Senate and the Houses. Our proposal obviously attempts a 
trade-off between local and national representation, Representatives being 
elected from local districts , Senators from large regions . The Senators, repre-
senting very large regions (we suggest between four and eight in number) , 
would presumably be much more attuned and responsive to national needs and 
interests than they are at present. But this seems to make very unlikely the 
possibility of agency representation by Senators . A representative , we said, acts 
like an agent to the extent that he or she is able (and willing) to translate 
constituency preferences into, and to promote or defend constituency interests 
and needs in, legislative decisions and other actions. If the capacity of represen-
tatives to act as agents is facilitated by reducing the number of constituents 
represented - and theoretically it surely is - it would appear that our proposal 
makes impossible agency representation by Senators . 
This, however , is not the case. Senators would not be locally representative; 
but agency representation is another matter altogether. While it is true that the 
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smaller the size of the unit represented , the greater the likelihood of agency 
representation , agenc y representation is also affected by other factors . And one 
of these - not frequentl y recognized - concerns the powers , and correspond-
ing duties , of the agent. Specificall y, the smaller the number of duties a 
representative has, the greater is his or her capacity to act as an agent. This 
theoretical link is due to the relationship between duties and electoral accoun t-
abilit y (and · anticipated reactions ). The smaller the numb er of duties to be 
performed by the agent , the greater the capacit y of the represent ed to discern 
past and / or promised performance by the agent during campaigns and , in turn, 
the greater the capacit y of the represented to register their preferences at 
election time. Now Senate campaigns would be primaril y focused on the 
character and level of taxing and spending ; citizens would then be able to 
register their preferences fairl y unambiguousl y on these issues (the issues being 
few in number ); and elected Senators would have a fairl y unambiguous 
mandate on which to act - as agents. This relationship is further strengthened 
by our having reduced the tenur e of Senators to four years . And it is further 
strengthened by our supposition , discussed briefl y below , concerning the proba-
ble frequenc y of issue voting given our structural arrang ements . 
In the case of Representatives , the arguments relating the expected quality 
of representation to small size and limited duties would both be operative, 
suggesting a very strong case for the likelihood of agency representation by 
House members . In fact , however , the probabilit y of agenc y representation 
would for House members be roughl y the same as it would for Senators , for 
Representatives would have more powers than would Senators . In other words, 
while our proposal reduces substantially the powers and corresponding duties of 
Representatives from what is currently the case, it still gives to Representatives 
relatively large number of such powers and duties . Consequently , the smaller 
number of citizens whose votes must be aggregated to establish a mandate, and 
whose interests and needs must between elections be represented , is crucial in 
off setting this fact. 
This complication aside, we nevertheless contend that our reforms would 
have the effect of simplifying electoral choice and so of enhancing the prospects 
for mandate elections ; of strengthening electoral accountabilit y; and of easing 
the always complicated task of representation . Both Senators and Represen ta-
tives would have to campaign for offices the powers and duties of which are 
quite limited in number and focused in content, thereby providing a struc-
turally -induced incentive for the adoption of issue-specific campaign plat-
forms . Voter turnout and interest could be expected to increase in a system in 
which annual elections present candidates whose powers and duties are clear, 
whose issue positions are advertised , and whose package offerings are not so 
complex as to make altogether impossible the probability of at least substantia l 
congruence between the package and the preferences of an electoral majority. 
The Senate 
Major powers : 
Composition : 
The Houses 
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(1) writes and passes all revenue bills 
(2) sets a binding national budget ceiling , and binding subceil-
ing targets for broad functional areas 
(3) acts as binding mediator in cases of jurisdictional disputes 
between Houses 
Senators elected on basis of population from regions for four year 
terms; one-quarter up for election each year. (Assuming, for 
example, eight regions, equal in population , then three Senators 
from each region would be up for election annually. The total 
number of Senators would then be ninety six). 
Major powers : (1) each House responsible for separate functional areas 
(2) within its functional specializations , each House allocates 
within budget ceilings; writes and passes all authorizing 
legislation; engages in oversight; has confirmation powers 
presently belonging to Senate; resolves intra-House jurisdic-
tional disputes. 
Composition: Representatives elected from present districts for four year 
terms; each district has one Representative in each of the four 
Houses; all the members of each House are up for election every 
four years, one House being up for election annually . 
